






















Environment and Production Technology Division 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 




International Livestock Research Institute 












EPTD Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a full 
peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most Discussion Papers 
will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised. 
 
THE EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABILITY ON 
LIVESTOCK AND LAND-USE MANAGEMENT: 
THE BORANA PLATEAU, SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA 
 
Nancy McCarthy, Abdul Kamara, and Michael Kirk 




The Borana people are the predominant ethnic group on the Borana Plateau in 
southern Ethiopia. Though traditionally transhumant pastoralists, they have recently 
increased their reliance on crops. Rainfall in the region averages between 353 mm to 873 
mm; variability is high, with coefficients of variation ranging from .21 to .68.  Anectdotal 
evidence implies that the vulnerability of pastoralist households to drought is increasing; 
stock levels increase dramatically during good rainfall years but plummet when rainfall is 
poor, indicating that the drought cycle is becoming more pronounced.  In recent years, 
there has also been a dramatic increase in land allocated to crops, and land allocated to 
pastures that are either privatized or accessible to only a small sub-group of people. 
Nonetheless, the Borana are still highly dependent on access to common grazing lands, 
which provide the predominant source of forage and, importantly, which also provide a 
mechanism to reduce risk of poor rainfall in one area by allowing for mobility.  Because 
many of the land resources are used and managed in common, it is hypothesized that one 
of the key determinants of the productivity and sustainability of the systems is the ability 
of community members to cooperate over the use and maintenance of these resources.  
  
In this paper, we develop indicators of cooperation and examine factors affecting 
these indicators. We then use these indicators to determine the impact of cooperation on 
stock densities and land allocation patterns.  Results indicate that cooperation is 
positively related to factors that increase the profitability of livestock, but negatively 
related to the total number of households, the use of community pastures by non-
community members, and heterogeneity of wealth within the community.   Furthermore, 
stock densities are negatively related to the index of cooperation as we would expect.  
Stock densities are also lower in areas with more highly variable rainfall indicating that 
high variability reduces the number of livestock held, contrary to the oft-mentioned 
hypothesis that households build greater stockholdings in areas were rainfall is highly 
variable in order to survive a drought with more animals.   Finally, results from the land 
allocation estimations give evidence to support the notion that more land is privatized - 
either for crops or pasture - where levels of cooperation are lower. Given the importance 
of mobility and the poor suitability of most land for cropping, measures to offset the 
increasing densities and land privatization should focus on improving the capacity of 
communities to cooperate and mitigate the impact of heterogeneity on that capacity, and  
on improving market access to improve cooperation and increase incentives to sell stock 
in good as well as poor rainfall years.  Results also highlight the need to search for 
alternative policy mechanisms that mitigate the impact of drought, but that do not 
simultaneously increase incentives to increase herd levels in non-drought years. 
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THE EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABILITY ON LIVESTOCK AND 
LAND-USE MANAGEMENT: 








Many of the property rights systems governing access, use and management rights to 
natural resources in Africa originated as communal systems with households having exclusive 
rights to croplands and shared access to rangelands, forests and water resources. These systems 
served well especially during phases of low population pressure and little environmental 
degradation. With the advent of high population pressure, increased market activity, and 
diminished authority of traditional leaders, a need for adapting these regimes to the increased 
pressure on the finite natural resource base has become a key policy concern (Pender et al., 1999; 
Bromley & Cernea, 1989; North, 1994; Hooper, 1994). Some scholars view traditional African 
land tenure systems as inefficient and advocate for various modifications. Although empirical 
studies now challenge the validity of these assertions (Okoth-Ogendo, 1995; Place & Hazell, 
1993; Ngaido, 1995), the former view triggered tenure reforms in most parts of the continent 
over the past decades. Both socialist and market-oriented land reforms have not performed in 
terms of increasing productivity, particularly in the semi-arid regions where extensive and semi-
extensive livestock production forms the basis of the household’s production activities and 
income.  Most of the reform codes were designed to replace existing community management 
systems with state ownership or models of private property.   Broad claims by the state to 
“pastoral” resources have led to a breakdown of traditional community management.  At the 
same time, these measures have largely been unaccompanied by effective state management of 
those resources, and open-access situations have often resulted (Niamir-Fuller, 2000).   
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Many attempts at “privatization” in these areas have been loosely based on the “Western 
ranch model”, where well-defined and rigid numbers of members were given title to a well-
defined area of land.  Though the Western ranch model itself was based on the assumption of 
private, individual property, these created ranches more closely resembled a common property 
resource with well-defined membership and a well-defined resource.  In most cases, the ranch 
model failed because:  1) the ranch areas were not sufficiently large to support enough livestock 
units per family, given the high spatial and temporal variation in rainfall and forage, and 2) in 
certain cases, large and powerful pastoralists became the de facto “owners” of the ranch, 
effectively excluding large segments of the population, and capturing rents on the ranches while 
still using remaining non-ranch based common pastures.  In these cases, the reforms certainly 
failed in terms of equity, and often in terms of efficiency as well (Swallow & Kamara, 1999).  
The reforms in Kenya after independence, in Ethiopia in the mid 1970s, and the rural code in 
Niger are some examples (Okoth-Ogendo, 1995; Tolossa & Asfaw, 1995; Ngaido, 1995). 
Oddly enough, at the same time that government and international donor projects 
promoting sedentarization via the ranch model were failing, there were also instances of more 
spontaneous--or pastoralist-driven--sedentarization, particularly in East Africa; a process which 
continues today.   However, most of these changes were not entirely driven by internal forces.  In 
many cases, they were precipitated by externally financed borehole or other water source 
development projects that raised the value of land around the water sources (Graham, 1988; 
Behnke, 1988; Ouedraogo, 1996; Grell & Kirk, 1999).  Another major factor promoting 
increased sedentarization and privatization of at least some of the rangeland have been actual 
and/or perceived changes in formal legal framework for land titling and the likelihood of land 
reform by national governments.  For instance, in Namibia, (Devereux, 1996) argues that large-
scale pre-emptive fencing of rangeland since independence has been caused by increased 
population pressure and thus increasing scarcity of forage and water resources (exacerbated by 
the return of exiles after independence) and by the belief that land reform would favor those with 
“claims” to land.   In regions where fencing specifically for rangeland is not permitted – 
rangeland being “state land” that is more or less managed by local elders and chiefs through the 
enforcement of traditional norms and rules – individual herders have instead registered claims to 
“cultivated” land, as in Ethiopia (Swallow and Kamara, 1999; Graham, 1988).  In these cases, 
rangeland is seen as under the control of local tribal leaders, but cropland can be individually  
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appropriated by applying to the requisite government authority.  In many cases, land is then used 
as pasture.  The bottom line is that, no matter what the driving force for initial phases of 
privatization and fencing – once herders perceive that they may lose all claims to land if they 
themselves do not fence, the loss of common grazing land becomes self-fulfilling. 
But privatization is certainly not the only efficient development pathway, particularly not 
in the semi-arid areas where environmental risk is a driving factor in land use and livestock 
productivity (Niamir-Fuller, 1999; Coppock, 1994; Behnke et al., 1993).   It has also been very 
forcefully argued by proponents of the “New Range Ecology” that, particularly for semi-arid 
rangelands that exhibit a relatively high degree of variation, mobility and thus access to a 
relatively large number of rangeland “patches” is required; such mobility is much more easily 
accommodated when rangelands are communal (c.f. Behnke et al., 1993; Niamir-Fuller, 1999)
4.  
Nonetheless, how much land is privatized will be a function of the productivity of the land when 
it remains in common, as well as other external pressures.  Thus, where communities can manage 
their rangeland resources
5, common property will be the most efficient (and perhaps equitable) 
property rights structure and we should observe less privatization, all else equal.  Private 
property will only become “optimal” when management of the common rangeland is so poor that 
it becomes welfare-increasing to individually appropriate land.  Note that in this case, the 
appropriator will be gaining higher mean returns per hectare, but a cost will be borne due to 
greater variability in production. 
Given that sub-Saharan Africa hosts about 25 million of the world's pastoral population 
deriving their livelihood directly from communal land use (Swallow, 1994), there is a need for 
an assessment of the major forces driving these changes so that their relevance to policy 
formulation can be evaluated.  This study is intended to enhance an understanding of these 
processes of change in Eastern Africa, using the Borana rangelands of Southern Ethiopia as a 
case study. These semi-arid southern rangelands support the livestock that are highly valuable to 
Ethiopia as sources of direct consumption and income of the Borana people, for the provision of 
draught power for smallholders in the highlands, and for export to generate foreign exchange. 
                                                 
4   These environments are usually termed non-equilibrial, or “at disequilibrium”.  Semi-arid rangelands with a 
coefficient of variation of rainfall above approximately .3-.33 are characterized as being non-equilibrial (Scoones, 
1994).   
5 We use the term “can manage” to imply that external agents recognize their authority to manage and that the 
community itself is capable of implementing management decisions internally.  
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Despite the consensus on the region's high ecological potential for livestock production, the area 
is seen as one that is still in crisis today, mostly due to pressure on the common rangelands, high 
population growth rates, and increased privatization for both cultivation and grazing. In some 
areas stocking rates are high, whereas the actual stocking rates in other areas fall below the 
potential carrying capacities. This trend is attributed to a series of factors, among which changes 
in property institutions is frequently cited (Hogg, 1997; Kerven & Cox, 1996; Coppock, 1994). 
Against this background, we undertake this study as an attempt to answer, with empirical 
evidence, some of the questions arising from current theoretical discussions on stock levels, 
rangeland degradation, and the commons. Theoretical considerations revolve around the theories 
of agricultural intensification and induced innovation, viewed from the perspective of collective 
action and institutional change (Boserup, 1981; Ostrom, 1990; Binswanger & McIntire, 1987; 
Lele & Stone, 1989). Proponents of these theories assert that population pressure; changes in 
market conditions and technology may induce changes at the local level as a result of changing 
factor scarcities and prices. Local level responses to these changes may depend on the available 
institutions facilitating the process, and on baseline community characteristics such as 
endowments of natural resources, infrastructure, and the stock of social capital. Based on these 
constraining factors, a divergence in preferences for property regimes may result, leading to 
different pathways of livestock intensification, land use patterns, and quality of the natural 
resource base (McIntire et al., 1992; North, 1994; Lele & Stone, 1989; Pender et al., 1996).  
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
  A field survey was conducted in forty rural communities in the six districts of the Borana 
rangelands from September 1997 through July 1998. The choice of the community as a unit of 
study is based on the fact that the spatial and temporal use of key production resources in the 
area is communal, and access is largely determined by community level decisions￿mostly by 
elders who define rules and ensure the implementation of sanctions and penalties. It therefore 
becomes expedient to look beyond the household for an analytical unit that corresponds to the 
level at which decisions about resource use and property rights are made. A community in this 
study consists of two or more pastoral settlements having common access to pastures and water 
resources to which they bear a common claim, called an arda.   
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STUDY AREA  
 
The Borana Rangelands occur on the south-most part of the Ethiopian lowlands 
occupying a total land area of about 95,000 km
2. It is located between latitudes 4-6 degrees 
North and 36-42 degrees East, sloping gently from 1600 meters in the north-east to about 1000 
meters in the extreme south that borders northern Kenya. The area is still predominantly in 
pastures comprised of flat plains forming the main parts of the range. There is an occasional 
occurrence of mountains, massive valleys and depressions. Occupied almost entirely by pastoral 
populations, resource use on the Borana rangelands is largely communal, though with crop 
cultivation and private enclosures that appear to be increasing in recent decades. The area 
exhibits a bimodal pattern of precipitation, with the long rains falling between March and May, 
and the short rains between September and November. Spatial and temporal variability in both 
the quantity and distribution of rainfall renders the area semi-arid, with an average annual 
rainfall varying from 353 mm to 873 mm per annum.  
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND STRATIFICATION 
    The communities were selected to represent different rainfall patterns (level and 
variation) and access to markets. A 14 year monthly rainfall data (1982-1996) from 12 weather 
stations located across the area were used to classify the communities into four different rainfall 
categories: high mean with high variation; high mean with low variation; low mean with high 
variation; and low mean with low variation. The weather stations also varied in terms of access 
to markets. The easy access category corresponds to those located within 25 km average distance 
from major markets, while those located farther than 25 km are categorized as difficult access
6. 
Three to five communities were randomly selected from around each station to cover the various 
rainfall categories and different degrees of market access. 
 
                                                 
6 The criteria is based on the fact that Boran pastoralists trek a maximum distance of about 20 to 25km a day. 
Locations beyond these distances are associated with high marketing costs both in terms of time and financial 
resources.  Since there is no transport of cattle in trucks until you reach the major market centers on the paved roads, 




STAGES OF THE DATA COLLECTION 
The first phase of the data collection employed a combination of standard questionnaires 
and rapid rural appraisal techniques. The respondents included community elders, heads of 
encampments or other key informants, responding as a group. Social mapping was used to assess 
the proportion of land under different types of land uses￿different types of common property 
grazing areas, transhumance routes, cultivated area, private enclosures etc. This was followed by 
rapid rural appraisals on wealth ranking and a closed-ended questionnaire capturing total 
livestock holdings, proportion of members engaged in non-farm income generating activities, 
rules and regulations over the various resources, and basic information on demographics and 
infrastructure.  This was followed by a physical identification of boundaries of the arda. A GPS-
instrument was used to obtain coordinates of community border points, which were later 
digitized and analyzed to generate community maps and land areas. Range quality data was also 
generated from each of the communities with the help of a range specialist. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, we present some descriptive statistics from the study area. 
 
 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Sample Communities 
  The communities consist of a total of about 200 settlements or pastoral encampments, with 
an average of 5 settlements per community. These constitute a total of 3141 households, with an 
average of 79 households per community, and 7 people per household. The total human 
population of all the communities is 21,637 people, with a mean of 541 people per community. 
About 26 percent of the households are female headed. The majority of the households are 
classified as poor (67 percent), about 21 percent as middle class and only 12 percent as wealthy
7. 
 
  Cattle is by far the most important livestock species held by the Borana pastoralists and 
accounts for about 90 percent of the total livestock holdings in the area. This amounts to about 
50,000 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) or 64,470 head of cattle. The remaining 10 percent 
consists of small ruminants, camels and equines. The mean number of livestock per community 
                                                 
7 This is based on the wealth stratification criteria suggested by the respective  communities according to their 
definitions and perceptions of wealth.  
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is 1249 TLU, with a minimum of 82 and a maximum of 5900 TLU. The average livestock 
holdings at the household level varies between 2 TLU for poorer households to above 100 TLU 
for wealthier ones, with an aggregate mean of 17 TLU. 
 
Current Land Use Patterns and Property Rights 
In this study, land use is aggregated into crop and livestock production, and property 
rights into private and common.  Figure 1 shows that about 84 percent of the total land area is 
allocated to livestock production activities while 16 percent is currently under crops. The land 
area under livestock is largely managed as different forms of common property (76 percent) 
denoted by (c) in Figure 1.   
  Warra grazing is by far the most predominant form of common property in the 
area constituting about 48.7 percent of the total land area. These are communal grazing areas for 





during the rainy seasons. They are accessible to all members of a defined community at 
specified periods of the year and for specified types of animals, but may be used by outsiders 
during some times of the year upon obtaining permission. In this context, warra areas largely fit 
48,7% warra(c)








Figure 1:  Land use patterns and property regimes in % of land area (c= common; 
p= private regime)  
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the definition of regulated common property resources.  Communal enclosures for calves and 
sick or weak animals account for about 9.17 percent of the total land area; these enclosures can 
pertain either to the entire community, or in many cases, to only a subset of households in one 
encampment.   
  Unlike warra areas, they are rarely open to non-arda members.  Community level 
enclosures and warra areas are present in about 83 percent of the sample communities and hence 
constitute the most important forms of common property resources. Forra areas are unrestricted 
communal grazing areas for dry herds￿non-lactating livestock ￿for all members of the Borana 
pastoral ethnic group. Spatial and temporal access to such areas is unregulated at all times. Forra 
areas generally constitute the largest communal grazing areas in Borana but being unsettled, they 
largely fall outside the boundaries of the communities under investigation, and thus comprise 
only about 1.22 percent of the total land area
8. Areas around settlements are used for grazing 
small ruminants, camels and equines. Private holdings account for about 23 percent of the total 
land area, allocated mainly to crop production (16.32 percent), partly to enclosed private grazing 
(3.67 percent), and partly to enclosed areas for draught animal grazing around cultivated field 
(3.93 percent). Private enclosures for grazing are relatively new phenomena that alludes to a new 
dimension in the dynamics of property rights in the area. Such trends were observed in 17.5 
percent of the communities under investigation.   
Appendix 1 contains a table of descriptive statistics for a number of variables; with 
communities assigned to four groups; high rainfall, low coefficient of variation; high rainfall, 
low coefficient of variation; low rainfall, low coefficient of variation; and, low rainfall, high 
coefficient of variation. 
                                                 
8 Our population densities are much higher than those previously reported.  This is because we took the land area for 
a particular community to be only that falling within the arda boundaries.  Densities over the entire plateau are 




3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
BASIC MODEL 
In this section, we develop a model of stock densities and land allocation at the 
community level.  The model is developed in stages; first we present equations based on a 
theoretical model of optimal stock densities and land allocation in the absence of rainfall 
variability, and based on the assumption that community members are not cooperating.  Next, we 
consider the theoretical effect of risk – in terms of rainfall variability – to the empirical model.  
Finally, we consider the effect that cooperation may have on community level decisions.  
Because there were no formal rules on stock densities in any of the communities, we do not 
directly observe a cooperative level reached by the community (which would itself define the 
stock densities).   Though our ultimate goal is to develop a proxy for the level of cooperation 
reached in each community, we are also concerned with factors which themselves determine the 
level of cooperation, and we digress to consider these variables in section 3.3. 
 
  To begin, we posit the following equations:  
 
( ) Hay TotalHH tion RangeCondi MktDist P P f SD g l , , , , / =  
 
( ) TotalHH SD Rain MktDist P P f L g l crops , , , , / % =  
 
( ) TotalHH SD f Lpvtpast , % =  
 
These equations are easily obtained from a non-cooperative game, where community 
members choose stock densities and land allocation (c.f. McCarthy et al., 1998).  Stock density 
determines the marginal product of land in common pastures, and is thus an explanatory variable 
in the land allocation equations.   In this model, the decisions on stock densities and land 
allocation are recursive.  A sufficient condition for recursivity is that livestock production can be 
characterized as a quadratic function of stock densities – a specification that has a great deal of  
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empirical support (Hart et al. 1989; Seligman et al. 1989).  Alternatively, we might think of the 
decision as sequential; in the first stage land allocation decisions are made, and in the second 
stage, given land allocated to pastures, members choose how many animals will be stocked per 
hectare.  Using backwards induction, we first calculate the stock densities that will arise from 
non-cooperative use of the rangeland and the resulting marginal product of land in pasture, and 
then calculate optimal land allocation based on this stock density. 
Stocking densities are hypothesized to be a positive function of range condition and of 






Pl , and a negative function of the distance to the 
nearest major markets (MktDist)
9.    Data for the range condition score was collected by a range 
specialist from the International Livestock Research Institute; the score is based on such 
measures as dry matter and crude protein content along transects within an arda, slope 
measurements, and the area covered by bush and barren land.  Total households (TotalHH) 
captures the extent of “overgrazing” since – in the absence of adoption of productivity enhancing 
technologies -- the total stock density at the community level should be independent of the total 
number of members
10. We observed very little adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies; 
use of purchased feeds was rare, crop residues were left in the fields, and grazing on these areas 
was for very short periods of time.  However, staff members at the Yabello-based CARE office 
have promoted haymaking technologies; we thus include a dummy variable for haymaking at the 
community level (Hay).   
The percent of land allocated to crops is hypothesized to be positively related to rainfall, 
and negatively related to the relative price of livestock/grain and the distance to market.  Because 
higher stock densities cause the marginal product of land in common pastures to be lower, we 
expect a greater allocation of land to crops, the higher is the stock density.  Also, total 
households will have an additional positive affect on land allocated to crops.  This is because 
land allocated to common pastures is akin to the provision of a public good; under non-
                                                 
9 Respondents of the community-level surveys were asked to identify the major markets for livestock and crops.  
Enumerators then calculated the distance to these markets.  Separate price data was collected by enumerators in the 
markets identified; therefore the prices used in the analysis are those from the markets, and are not “arda” or farm-
gate, prices. 
10 If the underlying production function is constant returns to scale, as we implicitly assume, then stock densities 
will be a function of the total number of households, and not to household density.  
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cooperation, we expect that less of the public good will be provided the greater is the number of 
members (c.f. McCarthy et al., 1998).  
In the simple model developed thus far, the only reason to allocate land to private 
pastures is the extent of non-cooperation on the common grazing land, here captured by stock 
densities and total households.   
 
RAINFALL VARIABILITY 
Next, consider output variability caused by erratic rainfall.  If we assume that the 
pastoralists are risk-averse livestock producers, then stock densities will be lower the higher is 
rainfall variability (Sandler and Sterbenz, 1990; McCarthy, 1999).  Thus, we hypothesize that 
higher variability will lead to lower stocking densities, and that these lower stock densities will 
in turn increase the marginal product of land in common pastures.  As before, lower stock 
densities will lead to greater marginal product of land, and as before, we expect lower stock 
densities to lead to lower allocations of land to crops and to private pasture.  On the other hand, it 
is difficult to predict the direct effect of rainfall variability on land allocation in the absence of 
specific information on the variance of crops, livestock outputs, and the co-variance between 
these activities.  Land in the study area is fairly marginal land (except key points), and rainfall is 
characterized by a bi-modal distribution leading to very short growing seasons.  Under these 
conditions, it is likely that crop output is more variable than livestock output, since livestock 
production is more mobile and flexible.  Even so, greater relative variability of crops vs. 
livestock is not sufficient to sign the direct impact of rainfall variability
11.  The theoretical sign 
of this variable is ambiguous, though under plausible assumptions on variability and co-variance 
across activities, we expect that land allocated to crops will be a negative function of rainfall 
variability. 
Also, it has been hypothesized by a number of researchers of semi-arid rangelands in sub-
Saharan Africa that areas with coefficients of variation greater than .33 will exhibit a different 
composition of forage species, and that these systems will exhibit “nonequilibrium” behavior, by 
which is meant that forage productivity is primarily dictated by rainfall, and that stocking 
                                                 
11 The problem of signing the response in a multi-output stochastic framework is made more complicated by the fact 
that cropping is undertaken on “private” land, and that livestock is undertaken on common land.  Given additional 
“risk” externalities when use of the common lands is characterized by non-cooperative behaviour, results that are 
standard under the complete private rights case no longer hold.  
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densities will have a very low or insignificant impact on forage productivity – as long as 
livestock are still mobile throughout the year [Ellis et.al., 1993; Niamir-Fuller, 2000].  This 
distinction now forms the basis of what is called “the new range ecology”.  Researchers 
supporting this distinction – largely range ecologists – have gone on to hypothesize that in these 
environments producers will try and build up large numbers of animals in more highly variable 
environments because a) stock densities will not affect future forage productivity, and b) it is a 
“better strategy”
12 to hold more animals in anticipation of a very bad rainfall realization -- the 
more you go in with, the more you come out with.  As noted above, we undertook our surveys in 
a year that followed six years of relatively average to good rainfall, and we expect to be on the 
“up side” in a drought cycle.  In the model developed below, we can test these two competing 
hypotheses by allowing the slope and intercept to change for communities with coefficients of 
variation above and below .33. 
 
 COOOPERATION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 
Finally, we consider what happens when communities attempt to manage their common 
pastures.  While no community had explicit rules on the number of livestock that could be held 
by each household, informal discussions revealed that members believed that there can be 
negative effects on each individual’s productivity if there are too many animals on the pastures 
for too many months of the year.  We thus hypothesize that implicit informal “rules” or norms 
may in fact operate to reduce stocking pressure.  
                                                 
12 The fact that this may be a best-response individual strategy under private pastures, but not a “better strategy” if 
in fact followed by all community members, is not much addressed in the literature.  To highlight the confusion in 
the literature, consider the following: Behnke & Scoones (1993, Chapter 1, pg. 15) write “Ellis and his colleagues 
found that in central Turkana, rainfall levels affected all aspects of the production system…  Livestock losses due to 
drought could cut herd sizes in half, but there was little evidence that rates of loss were closely related to stocking 
rates” But, here’s what Ellis et.al. (1990, pg. vi) actually report:  “The results of this study suggest that several 
characteristics of Turkana pastoral systems are related directly to drought resistance and inversely to famine 
susceptibility… low to moderate stocking rates”.   Communities with lower stocking densities relative to their 
regional ‘carrying capacities’ “fared better… in terms of lower overall livestock mortality, more rapid recovery of 
livestock herds after the drought and greater continuity of an adequate food supply from pastoral products” (Ellis 




The literature on factors associated with successful management of common-pool resources is 
vast
13.  Many of these factors can be thought of as shift variables in a cost function for 
undertaking various collective action activities -- including the management of common pool 
resources – and may be thought of as social capital.  Put differently, these factors should lower 
costs for any activity the group chooses to undertake, and are distinct from the underlying 
technical characteristics of those separate activities (Dutilly, 2000).   Nonetheless, measures of 
“social capital” are difficult to capture in many field situations
14.  The densities of various 
networks are one of the main components of many social capital studies; but our data was 
collected at the community level, and as such only picked up information on relevant 
community-level institutions, specifically those in charge of resource management.   Our 
ultimate goal is to develop an indicator of the level of cooperation reached in other activities, and 
to relate this measurement to observed stock densities and land use patterns, which is somewhat 
different than capturing “social capital” per se.  We thus construct indicators of (non-) 
cooperation based on observable features of resource management institutions’ structure and 
function, such as the number of meetings held per year, percent of members attending, number of 
different types of rules over the various natural resources, and violations occurring in the last five 
years.    In particular, the number of rules and violations are themselves a function of social 
capital.  We hypothesize that success in creating and enforcing rules in activities other than stock 
densities will adequately capture the underlying social capital within each community.    In order 
to test whether or not indicators in fact capture degrees of cooperation or non-cooperation, we 
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The index of non-cooperation is hypothesized to be a positive function of the total 
number of households since the greater the number of households, the higher are the individual 
                                                 
13 Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; and Berkes and Folke, 1998 are a few volumes containing empirical examples. 
14 The World Bank has produced a number of documents useful for operationalizing the concept of  “social capital”; 
including a working paper series from the Local Level Institutions Study which are available from Social 
Development Family, Environmentally and Socially  Sustainable Development Network and the Environmentally 




incentives not to abide by agreements, and the more difficult it is to reach consensus and enforce 
decisions.  Greater heterogeneity in wealth is hypothesized to lead to differences in levels of risk 
aversion, and the greater are these differences, the more difficult it will be for members to find 
agreements that leave all members better off
15.   The index is also hypothesized to be a positive 
function of whether or not outsiders regularly come into the arda since benefits from reduced 
stocking pressure will then accrue to non-members.  Members engaging in seasonal migration 
outside the community may represent less pressure on the resources, and is in fact one 
mechanism to reduce grazing pressure, but it may also make it more difficult to make and 
enforce rules, thus the sign of this variable is ambiguous.  Outside wage work is hypothesized to 
be associated with greater opportunity costs of community participation, and to lead to a higher 
index of non-cooperation.  Favorable relative livestock prices, shorter distances to markets, and 
range quality are hypothesized to be negatively related to non-cooperation.   Though individual 
incentives to cooperate and not cooperate increase with variables that increase profitability, the 
overall effect is in favor of greater cooperation (c.f. McCarthy et.al., 2000).  Finally, rainfall 
variability is hypothesized to negatively affect non-cooperation – the greater the variability the 
greater are the gains to cooperation vis-à-vis the gains from cheating (McCarthy,1999). 
Incorporating environmental variability and the index of non-cooperation into the stock 
density and land allocation model leads to the following equations: 
   
( ) RainVar NC I TotalHH tion RangeCondi MktDist Pc Pl f SD , , , , , / - =  
( ) RainVar NC I TotalHH MktDist Pc Pl f Lcrops , , , , / % - =  
 
( ) RainVar NC I TotalHH SD f Lpvtpast , , , % - =  
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS 
                                                 
15 In the case of regulating use-rates on a common-pool resource exhibiting both non-exclusion (of members) and 
subtractibility in use, we posit that the effect of heterogeneity in wealth on cooperation will always be non-positive.  
This is in contrast with recent debates in the literature on the role of heterogeneity, where oftentimes the objective of 
cooperation is more akin to providing a public good (non-subtractibility in use), where heterogeneity in wealth may 




In order to develop indicators of cooperation/non-cooperation, we perform a factor 
analysis on those variables thought to represent the extent of cooperation reached.  We included 
number of meetings per year as well as the percentage of the community members attending; the 
sum of rules pertaining to pasture and water point use and maintenance; the sum of rules 
pertaining to grazing, water, settlement and cultivation; and the number of violations of these 
rules occurring in the last five years
16.   Grazing rules often referred to restrictions on types of 
animals using various parts of the range, seasonal restrictions on access, and use of calf and draft 
animal enclosures.  Water rules were largely comprised of maintenance activities and seasonal 
restrictions.  Settlement and cultivation rules mainly consisted of obeying “zoning” restrictions 
and fence maintenance.  Because we are interested in the structure of the cooperation “model”, 
we employ factor analysis.  Using STATA software
17, we performed a principal components 
factor analysis, and obtained factor loadings and scoring coefficients from rotated factors using 
the varimax option.   Four components had eigenvalues greater than 1; factor loadings are 
presented in Table 1 below.   
 
Table 1--Results of Factor Analysis – Factor Loadings 
Variable  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3  Factor 4 
Number of Meetings per Year  .029   .706   .240   .048 
Percent Members Attending  .404  -.324  -.224   .531 
Sum Grazing Rules  .060  -.014   .835   .170 
Sum Water Rules  -.014   .374  -.578   .490 
Sum Settlement Cultivation Rules  .229   .082  -.206  -.812 
Violations: Grazing Rules  .913   .154   .181  -.079 
Violations: Water Rules  .114   .841  -.224  -.132 
Violations: Settlement & Cultivation Rules  .692  -.094  -.429  -.106 
 
 
                                                 
16 We restricted violations per rule to these rules, as there were many instances where there were no rules 
    on either settlement or cultivation. 
17 All calculations were performed using STATA, unless otherwise indicated.  
 
16
As can be easily seen, none of the factors is readily interpreted, and the fact that four 
factors are retained out of seven variables indicates that correlation among the variables is not 
extraordinarily high.  The first factor has relatively low but positive loadings on variables 
thought to positively affect cooperation, but also high loadings on violations.  The second factor 
has high loadings on meetings and water rules, but a strong negative loading on percent of 
members attending.  It also has a very strong loading on water violations, but a negative loading 
on settlement and cultivation rules, and a relatively low loading on grazing violations.  The third 
and fourth factors are equally difficult to interpret.   We proceed by obtaining the factors scores 
for only the first two factors, which are as follows: 
Table 2--Results of Factor Analysis – Scoring Coefficients 
Variable  Factor 1  Factor 2 
Number of Meetings per year    .035    .498 
Percent Members Attending    .288   -.202 
Sum Grazing Rules    .140    .048 
Sum Water Rules   -.044    .260 
Sum Settlement & Cultivation Rules    .074   -.020 
Violations: Grazing Rules    .622    .092 
Violations: Water Rules    .028    .560 
Violations: Settlement and Cultivation Rules    .412   -.110 
 
 
Following the loadings, the first factor has a low loadings number of meetings, 
percentage attendance, and rules.  It also has very high and positive loadings on the rule violation 
variables, particularly grazing and settlement and cultivation rules.  We thus hypothesize that this 
factor captures non-cooperation.  The second factor is quite mixed.  In terms of violations, here 
water violations have a strong scoring coefficient, but grazing rules and settlement and 
cultivations rules are low or negative.  Also in contrast to factor 1, the second factor has a high 
coefficient on meetings, but a negative coefficient on percentage attending.  Given the contrast 
with the first factor, then, we hypothesize that this factor captures degree of cooperation – 
notwithstanding the high loadings on both water rules and violations.    
We then regressed the indices on factors hypothesized to affect cooperation.  Total 
households and the square of households were used to test the hypothesis that cooperation is 
more difficult both with relatively few households (because of fixed costs) and with many 
households (because of higher communications costs).  Higher relative prices, higher range  
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quality, and shorter distance to markets are hypothesized to increase cooperative levels, since 
gains to cooperating should be greater than gains to not cooperating as prices and range quality 
increase and distance falls.  Cooperation should also be greater where the coefficient of variation 
in rainfall is greater, since gains to cooperating should increase relative to gains from not 
cooperating the higher the variability in rainfall (McCarthy, 1999); we also allow for a non-linear 
affect of rainfall variability by adding a squared term.  A dummy variable indicating whether 
community members migrated to outside pastures for at least 1 month during the preceding year 
and a variable capturing the number of months outsiders used community pastures were 
included; both are expected to decrease cooperation, the first because benefits will not accrue to 
community members alone, and the second because communication may be more difficult when 
people are more mobile.   The percentage of members engaged in outside wage work is 
hypothesized to capture the opportunity cost of dedicating time to community activities.  
Heterogeneity is measured by the coefficient of variation in livestock holdings for the wealthy, 
moderate, and poor wealth classes, as determined by the communities.  A gini-type coefficient 
was also generated, but this measure of distribution did not perform as well as the simpler 
measure of distance.  If smaller members do not form coalitions, then finding agreements 
mutually beneficial to all will in fact be a function of the distance between the “biggest” and 
“smallest”, and not a function of the distribution per se.  Heterogeneity is hypothesized to 
negatively affect cooperation due to fewer agreements mutually beneficial to all.   Results are 
presented below
18.   
 
                                                 
18 All estimations were performed using STATA 6.0; all used the cluster option to account for the clustering of 
communities around rainfall stations.  
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Table 3—Regression Results – Cooperation Indices         
Dependent Variable  NonCoop 
Coefficient     t-stat 
Coop 
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*   = significant at the 10% level 
** = significant at the 5% level 
 
The NonCoop variable indeed seems to capture non-cooperation.  However, non-
cooperation is at first increasing and then decreasing in total households – contrary to the fixed 
cost/ increasing variable cost hypothesis.  The total impact is always positive in survey 
communities, but begins to decline at 285 households; in our sample just one community is 
larger than 285.  High prices lead to lower non-cooperation, though distances to market do not 
have any statistically significant affect.  Range quality is also negative, but not quite significant 
at the 10 percent level.   In-migration positively affects NonCoop; which gives support to the 
hypothesis that use of core community grazing resources by others reduces incentives for 
community members themselves to cooperate.  At the same time, when community members use 
outside pastures, non-cooperation is reduced.  Instead of capturing additional costs of monitoring 
and enforcing agreements within the community when members are absent, out-migration may 
relieve stocking pressure on community grazing and water resources thereby contributing to 
easier management of those resources.  The higher the percentage of members engaged in  
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outside wage work and the greater the degree of heterogeneity in wealth, the higher is NonCoop, 
as hypothesized.  Coefficient of variation in rainfall, however, has no effect.  Overall, this 
regression has good explanatory power, and results coincide with the main hypothesis regarding 
factors influencing the degree of non-cooperation.   
The Coop variable also appears to capture cooperation, though results are more difficult 
to interpret than for the NonCoop variable.  Households and households squared have the same 
effect – and almost the same coefficients – as for the NonCoop variable; though this is in 
accordance with the fixed/variable cost model; the impact of number of households is always 
positive in this sample, contrary to expectations.  However, the higher the relative variability in 
rainfall, the greater is cooperation, though this too decreases at higher coefficients of variation; 
nonetheless, the effect is always positive for sample communities.  Prices favoring the activity 
dependent on common pool resources (livestock versus grains, which rely on pastures and water 
resources) also positively affect this index of cooperation.  Unlike the NonCoop variable, 
mobility by either insiders or outsiders has no significant impact, nor does the degree of 
heterogeneity.   
 
STOCKING-RATE EQUATION 
Because the indicators developed above are not without certain difficulties in 
interpretation, we present two specifications for the stocking rate equations – the first with the 
indices, and the second with the explanatory variables themselves.  We use a log-linear 
specification for stock densities, where fixed “input” variables and prices are in log form (total 
households, relative livestock prices, and distances to market), but shift variables are in levels 
(the cooperation indices, range quality, haymaking dummy, in-migration, dummy for out 
migration, percent members engaged in wage work, and the heterogeneity variable).  The index 
variables, NonCoop and Coop, have also been normalized to lie in the 0-1 interval, to facilitate 
interpretation of results.  As with the index equations, the stocking rate equations were also 
corrected for heteroskedasticity; results are presented in Table 4 below.      
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Table 4—Regression Results – Stock Densities 
Dependent Variable:   Stock Density 
Coefficient   t-stat 
Stock Density 
Coefficient   t-stat 
 
Total Households 
(in natural logs) 
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  0.64 
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*   = significant at the 10% level 




In the first specification, the total number of households, relative livestock prices, and the 
NonCoop variable all positively affect stocking densities as predicted; range quality and the 
coefficient of variation in rainfall variables also have a positive effect but are not quite 
statistically significant.  Coop is negative, but is also not quite significant at the 10 percent level.  
Neither the haymaking dummy nor distance to market had any significant impact on stock 
densities.  The coefficient times the dummy for highly variable areas has a negative and 
significant effect, as does the dummy variable itself, thereby lending support to the hypothesis 
that it is precisely in the relatively high variability environments where lower livestock densities  
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are observed, and not higher densities as has been suggested.  However, it may be the case that 
high variability environments are less densely populated, so that animals per household can 
increase in response to the higher variability, without necessarily leading to higher stock 
densities per se.  In order to check this hypotheses, we can estimate stock levels instead of stock 
densities, and include the fixed factor of pasture land as an explanatory variable.  These 
equations perform similarly to those presented above, the slope and intercept effects at relatively 
high coefficients of variation remain negative and significant; results are found in Appendix 2.   
The second specification performs similarly to the first; the adjusted R-squareds are 
almost the same at .65 and .64, respectively.  Though the haymaking variable changes signs, all 
other coefficients remain of the same sign.  It is interesting to note that variables such as total 
households, prices, range quality, distance, and coef. of variation in rainfall are expected to pick 
up both a direct effect as in the first specification, but also an indirect effect via cooperation.  As 
shown in Table 4, the coefficient on households increases vis-à-vis the first specification – 
capturing the additional effect from lowering cooperation; and the coefficient on prices and 
range quality capturing the additional positive effect.  Distance also becomes more negative, as 
we would expect, but this variable is not significant in either specification.  Finally, of the 
variables hypothesized to directly affect cooperation, we see that the heavier is use of home 
pastures by outsiders and the greater the heterogeneity within the community, the higher are 
stock levels; out-migration and wage work have no statistically significant effect. 
 
LAND ALLOCATION EQUATIONS 
The dependent variables for the land allocation equations are given in percentage (times 
100) terms; there are 6 zero observations for land allocated to crops, and 3 zeros for land in 
private pastures.  Despite the fact that we cannot use logs for the dependent variables, the 
specification for the explanatory variables remains similar to the stock density equations. In 
addition to the variables discussed above – total households, relative livestock, grain prices, 
distance to market, rainfall, rainfall variability, and the cooperation indices – in the cultivation 
equation we add the number of years a community has been cultivating.  As noted in the 
introduction, the Boran are historically livestock keepers, with more limited historical experience 
with cropping.   Other authors have argued that cropping used to be undertaken sporadically in 
order to capture benefits during very good rainfall years, or alternatively, was undertaken by  
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those who had lost their herds and was seen as a “stop-gap” measure undertaken only until the 
family could reconstruct their herds (Swallow and Kamara, 1999).  In the past twenty years or 
so, however, anecdotal evidence seems to support a more permanent shift into cropping; in these 
cases learning by observation and by doing will be important explanatory variables in 
understanding land allocation decisions.  We lack data more appropriate to test spillover learning 
effects, and instead include the years cropping has been undertaken in order to proxy these 
effects.  A SUR model was used; results are presented below in Table 5.   
 
 Table 5—Regression Results – Land Allocation 
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Though the computed R-squared statistic above is .5 for both equations, only one 
individual coefficient is statistically significant, years cultivating.  For the land allocated to 
private pastures, the computed R is quite small, and the only significant coefficient is stock 
densities.  Further, we hypothesized that the sign of this variable would be positive – higher 
densities would reduce the marginal product of land in common pastures, and should thus lead to 
more land allocated to private pastures.  The cooperation indices have no statistically significant 
effect in either equation.  When we substitute the exogenous factors hypothesized to affect 
cooperation directly into the estimations in the last two specifications, we see that the dummy for 
whether community members routinely migrate out of the community for at least one month per 
year is the only statistically significant coefficient in the land allocated to private pastures 
equation.  Coinciding with the impact on stock densities, this variable captures reduced pressure 
on home grazing areas, and thus fewer benefits to privatization. 
In our sample there are three communities with land allocation to private pastures and 
cropland exceeding 75 percent of the total land area.  In one community, this reaches 94 percent.  




   Table 6—Regression Results – Land Allocation, Reduced Sample 
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The coefficients are similar in the land allocation equations to those obtained with the full 
sample, and the “R-squared’s” remain the same.  However, in the specification using the 
cooperation indices, two coefficients are now statistically significant – a positive coefficient on 
prices and negative coefficient on Coop.  The sign of relative price variable is positive in all four 
specifications, contrary to the hypothesis that more land would be allocated where grain prices 
were relatively high.  The coefficient of variation of rainfall is positive but just shy of being 
significant at the 10 percent level, indicating perhaps a weak effect of crops as a risk 
management tool.  More interestingly, neither average rainfall nor total households have any  
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impact on land allocated to crops, all else equal.  Coop is negative, indicating that higher levels 
of cooperation lead to less land being allocated to crops, as hypothesized.  In the second 
specification for cropland allocation, we return to a situation where only the years cultivating 
variable is significant. 
Unlike the case for cropland, the reduced sample leads to significant changes in the 
estimations.  The “R-squared’s” improve rather dramatically, more coefficients are statistically 
significant, and the size of the coefficients changes.  In particular, average rainfall now has a 
statistically significant negative impact on percent land allocated to private pastures; the 
coefficient of variation has a positive and significant impact in the first specification, which loses 
significance in the second.  The NonCoop variable is positive as expected; Coop is negative, but 
not statistically significant.  Of the exogenous cooperation variables replacing the indices in the 
second specification, the in-migration variable has a positive effect, as does heterogeneity in 
wealth.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In general, many of the hypotheses generated by the conceptual model are borne out in 
the data analysis.  Communities with a lower index of non-cooperation and a higher index of 
cooperation, or those with less heterogeneity and less in-migration, have lower stocking 
densities.  It is important to note that even though there were no explicit rules regarding stock 
holdings at the individual level or well-defined limits on stock densities at the level of the 
community, the empirical results give strong evidence that there is in fact a mechanism in place 
to reduce overstocking, but the efficacy of this mechanism appears to differ across communities.   
Of the variables hypothesized to affect the level of cooperation reached, in-migration and 
heterogeneity had a consistent non-cooperative impact, directly on the cooperation indices and 
the stock density equations, and to a lesser extent, on percentage of land allocated to private 
pastures.  Though the land allocation equations are not very robust, it is interesting to note that 
cooperation seems to play a bigger role in reducing land allocated to crops (Coop being 
significantly related to highly variable communities with relatively greater numbers of 
households, and where relative livestock prices were favorable), and land allocated to pastures 
responded more to non-cooperation (NonCoop being significantly related to communities with  
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many households, a high degree of heterogeneity, little out migration but heavier in-migration, 
and a larger percent of members engaged in outside wage work).   
The additional effect of increased households on stock densities is also consistent with 
non-cooperation and with increased stock densities above those associated with socially optimal 
rates; to the extent that “complete” cooperation cannot be reached, the degree of overgrazing will 
be a function of the number of members.  There is limited evidence of intensification of animal 
production – i.e. there is very little use of purchased feeds/concentrates or other inputs – that 
might otherwise support an hypothesis of population-driven intensification allowing for more 
animals per hectare without decreasing output per hectare or total output.  Indeed, the haymaking 
dummy (admittedly a crude measure) was not significant in either stock density equation. 
Market prices and range quality have two distinct, and offsetting, effects on stock 
densities.  The direct price and range quality responses are positive, but higher prices and better 
range quality also appear to lead to greater levels of cooperation, as reflected in the estimated 
equations for NonCoop and Coop.  Market distance had no significant effect on cooperation, 
stock densities or land allocation.  Whereas livestock are mobile, the lack of effect on land 
allocation, particularly to crops, is somewhat surprising.   
Though results from the land equations are not entirely satisfying, the evidence does 
support the hypothesis that current changes in land use patterns –  increases in both private 
pastures and cropped land – are, in part, a function of the desire of individuals to diminish 
negative externalities associated with use of common pastures.  Unlike the stock density 
equations, however, the impact seems to be captured completely by the cooperation variables; 
there does not appear to be an additional impact via increased households, as would be expected.  
The number of years a community has been cultivating has a robust positive impact on the 
percent of land allocated to crops; an increase in a year’s experience with cropping increases the 
percent of cropland by just under one half of one percent.    
Thus, both anecdotal evidence as well as empirical results from this study support the 
notion that cropland and private pastures are related to permanent structural changes in land 
allocation, rather than temporary responses to rainfall shocks.  Increased allocations of land to 
private uses may improve household incomes and reduce variability in output up to a point, but it 
appears that “too much” land is becoming privatized in some communities, due to lack of 
cooperation over pasture management and land allocation provisions.  In these cases, cooperation  
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can mitigate the tendency to over-allocate land to private uses.  One of the key elements in 
fostering cooperation will be methods for handling the increased heterogeneity among 
community members, and in more effectively managing the communities’ relationship with 
outsiders who use community pastures.  Nonetheless, few variables were robust across the land 
allocation equations, and the estimations performed poorly for the entire sample.  Because the 
area of land dedicated to private uses is apparently increasing every year, a better understanding 
of the factors driving such changes is necessary. 
Finally, we note that the coefficient of variation in rainfall has a significant positive 
impact on the level of cooperation as captured in Coop, and also has a significant negative 
impact on stocking rates in communities that are described as “non-equilibrial”.  Thus, areas with 
high coefficients of variation of rainfall have lower stocking rates due to both a direct negative 
impact and to an indirect effect through cooperation.   The direct effect is interesting in and of 
itself; as noted above, many researchers have called for a complete re-thinking of rangeland 
management in the semi-arid and arid regions, have derived policy recommendations for pastoral 
development and resource management, and have been somewhat successful in getting donor 
projects in adopting some of these recommendations.  However, many of these recommendations 
are based on the assumption that pastoralists hold relatively large numbers of animals precisely 
because of environmental variability.   In other words, in the face of fluctuations in livestock 
outputs and herd sizes due to environmental variability, the best option (all else equal) for the 
pastoralist is to hold large herds.  The implication is that a reduction in variability of livestock 
outputs would lead to a reduction in herd sizes.  Again, our results are not consistent with this 
argument, and suggest that any policies aimed at mitigating the impact of rainfall variability on 
livestock production must first consider the impact on community-level cooperation in the 
management of common-pool rangelands, and must also recognize the fact that stock densities 






    Low Rain, Low CoV  Low Rain, High CoV  High Rain, Low CoV  High Rain, High CoV 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev 
Average  Rainfall  451.25 62.21  436.00 39.55  696.67 47.22  711.36  184.18 
Coef.  of  Var.  Rainfall  .30 .07  .48 .02  .27 .05  .48 .10 
Total  Households  38.00 29.93  27.38 16.35  69.58 33.54  157.09  119.20 
Total  Hectares  1176.94 439.30  1166.91 876.96  1089.23 517.93  1203.64 769.19 
Stock  Densities  .92 .90  .64 .61  .78 .34  1.78  1.98 
 percent Land in Crops  2.50  4.10  8.75  4.43  19.58  16.29  25.46  15.88 
 percent Land in Pvt. 
   Pasture 
14.50 5.98  23.12 6.51  18.83  24.65  15.45  11.50 
Rel.  Price  Livestock  .74 .02  .72 .02  .91 .18  .91 .25 
Distance  to  Market  59.75 36.11  49.38 29.34  28.00 21.92  38.81 24.89 
Range  Quality  3.38 1.69  3.25 1.67  2.42 1.62  3.00 1.55 
Hay  25.20 46.29  12.50 35.35  17.24 39.18  64.32 50.44 






APPENDIX 2:  REGRESSIONS OF STOCK LEVELS 
 
Dependent Variable:  Stock Level 
Coefficient    t-stat 
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